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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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FROM - USAID/Kabul

SUBJECT : Development Grant Program Evaluation

REFERENCE - AIDTO Circular NA 17

In accordance with instructions contained referenced circular,
attached is a case history report of the project, Trade and
Industrial Education. A classified section will be sent under
separate cover.

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Project Title and Number:

1962 Project #306-N-69-AC (Technical Education)

1963 Activity #306-AA-61-AH-1, Trade and Industrial Education

I. The Background Situation

Afghanistan has experienced a long isolation from which it has been struggling to escape for the last half century. Afghanistan is a small, land-locked country of approximately 250,000 square miles in area with an elevation ranging from near sea level to peaks above 20,000 feet. The rainfall is light and limited to a short season but deposits of melting snow contribute to the maintenance of water supply during the long dry season. Lack of water makes it difficult for the agricultural economy to promote the orderly raising of crops. However, large portions of the arid land are capable of providing pasturage for sheep, goats, donkeys and camels.

The population of Afghanistan is estimated to be anywhere from 7,000,000 to 12,000,000. A large portion of the population is made up of nomadic people who winter in the lowlands of India and Pakistan, returning to the Afghan grazing lands with their flocks as the cold recedes. Although Afghanistan is not technically a part of the Arab world, it is closely related to it by the Moslem faith. While the cultural aspect of the religion has been considerably modified in many other Moslem countries, it continues with unabated vigor in Afghanistan in almost a "pure" form.

The remoteness and ruggedness of the country, coupled with the culture of its people, are largely responsible for its long isolationism. The interest and attention of European nations were detracted from Afghanistan to ~~xx~~ other countries where they established colonial administrations. While Afghanistan was subjected to periods of strong foreign influence, the details of government tended to remain in the hands of the Afghans.

The Royal Government of Afghanistan (RGA) resumed independent functioning in 1919. It had then and still has many divergent problems with which to cope. Foremost among these problems have been the developing of a national school system, suitable industries, and the promoting of transportation facilities involving at least a skeleton network of airports and highways.

Vocational-Technical Education specifically, which is a part of the broad coverage of Vocational Industrial Education (Trade and Industrial) is the subject of this study. The Afghan Institute of Technology (AIT) in Kabul is the only school in Afghanistan whose stated objective is to train technicians. If the country is to progress socially and economically, it must provide maintenance and supervising technicians in keeping with its needs. Since its economy is agricultural, industrial

needs should be largely confined to the processing of agricultural products and by-products rather than to expand in areas where raw materials are not available. An urgent need exists in the areas encompassing service trades, electric power, communications, highway construction, and repair and maintenance of all types of equipment. This situation is comparable, in varying degrees, with that of many emerging countries.

The initial effort to establish a technical training center in Kabul was undertaken in 1948. The project, known as the Afghan Institute of Technology, was a cooperative endeavor between the RGA and interested friends in the United States. It was doomed to many delays and disappointments. The formation and operation of a non-profit corporation, AIT, Incorporated, established by a group of interested Americans, provided assistance in excess of 120,000 dollars, assuring the success of the project. The RGA provided partially completed school buildings, locally available school supplies, transportation costs of donated equipment, transportation expenses for the families of the five original American teachers, board and clothing for the students, and a 5,000 dollar annual budget for additional equipment from the United States. The RGA also concentrated on the completion of the school buildings.

AIT officially opened with the beginning of the spring session in 1951. During the next three years beginning with FY 1952, there was an increased interest in the school, with the result that TCA provided five instructors and commodities in the sum of 12,500 dollars. UNESCO provided two instructors and a small amount of equipment.

In 1955 ICA officially took over assistance to the school through a contract with the University of Wyoming which provided seven technicians that year. For the duration of the contract, Wyoming yearly provided technicians ranging from nine in 1956 to four in 1961. Only two of the four remained on December 31, 1961 when the University's contract obligations were phased out. Two direct-hire AID technicians assumed advisory roles for the school on January 1, 1962.

II. Objectives

The Afghan Institute of Technology was the first institution of its kind established in Afghanistan and today still remains the only school of its kind. Various Ministries, including the Ministry of Education, recognize the urgent need for the school in fulfilling the purpose of training technicians.

A. The major short-range objectives are as follows:

1. To train technicians for the needs of the country. This objective is clearly expressed in a report by a Wyoming Project Advisor:

"AIT today is an institution to train technicians for the vast needs of a developing Afghanistan. To understand what is meant by the term 'technician', the following definition is helpful..... 'A technician is a supervising, operating or maintenance person in any number of industrial fields. He is not a designer nor is he a professional engineer. Neither is he a skilled mechanic nor a journeyman. His area of work activity is between that of the professional engineer and the skilled craftsman. He is a technical specialist who translates the designs and plans of the engineer into action'".

2. Provide a curriculum at all grade levels (10th, 11th, and 12th) that will prepare 12th grade graduates for entrance in the Faculty of Engineering of Kabul University. (Approximately 25 per cent of the graduates have enrolled in the Faculty to date. The Ministry of Education hopes to increase this percentage to 50 per cent in the near future.)

3. Provide a curriculum that will prepare 12th grade graduates for entrance into employment as technicians.

4. Provide a strong English language program essential to success in both the Faculty of Engineering and employment as technicians. English is the most universally used technical language and the language of instruction at the Faculty of Engineering.

5. Provide in-service training within the school and advanced training abroad to upgrade the school staff.

B. The basic long-range objectives are as follows:

1. To increase the coverage of training by adding the 13th and 14th grades so that the training of technicians can become a reality rather than a stated purpose of the school. This involves the adding of technical areas, additional equipment, and a new school plant with increased enrollment and staff.

2. To assist in promoting preparatory training of an Industrial Arts nature in the middle (Junior High) schools to serve as a screening device for entrance into AIT at the 10th grade level.

3. To assist in the development of functional instructional materials which can eventually be translated into the Persian language. (This could fulfill the wish of the RGA to have all teaching materials eventually available in Persian. This must be a well programmed process.)

4. To upgrade the Afghan staff, through in-service and participant training, to a point where they can successfully operate the school without advisory assistance.

III. Resources Committed

The agreement between ICA and the host government called for the Wyoming University, through a contract, to provide assistance in the form of technicians, participant training, commodities and other costs. This type of assistance is being rendered generally, as of this date, but with direct-hire technicians supplied by AID as of January 1, 1962. It was felt that direct-hire technicians could do a better job at AIT than a contract team. Host government resources committed to support and promote this program have been in the nature of facilities, school administration and instructor counterparts, heating equipment, limited operational expenses, and some local purchase funds.

Tables 1 and 2 give the breakdown of US obligations and host government contributions. Information on either item prior to 1957 is extremely limited due to a lack of official documents.

TABLE #1

Total US Obligations
1957 thru FY '62
(In Thousands \$)

Year	Technicians		Participants	Commodities			Total
	Contr./Dir.	Hire		Under Contr.	Outside Contr.	Other Costs	
Prior to 1957	(Breakdown not available)						
1957	125	-	12	35		13	185
1958	187.5	-	43.7	7.5	8.6	10.7	258
1959	38.9	-	28.7	24		14.4	106
1960	125.5	-	20.5	30			176 1/2
1961							
1962		43	63		30.5	2.5	139
Total thru 6/30/62							864
FY 1963	55		100		135	15	305

^{1/} Pro-Ag of 1960 was for a total of \$163,000 which was amended by \$13,000 to cover the remaining terms of the Wyoming contract which was phased out 12/31/61.

TABLE
Total Host Government Contributions
1957 - 1962
(In 1,000 Afs. unless otherwise)
Fluctuating Rates from 1952.35

Year	Contributions in Kind <u>1/</u>	Revolving	Local Purchase	Total
Prior to 1957				2,730 <u>2/</u>
1957	2,100			2,100
1958	1,362			1,362
1959	2,182		180	2,362
1960	2,292		70	2,362
1961	1,997			1,997 <u>3/</u>
1962	2,658			2,658
TOTAL				15,571

- 1/ This column includes cost of repair and maintenance of the buildings and grounds; administrative expenses; salaries of Afghan teachers, assistants and workers; clothing and feeding of students, payment of salary to participants' families; and some expenses for expendable supplies.
- 2/ Host government contributions for 1957 and prior years, but breakdown is not known.
- 3/ In 1961 and 1962 AIT was a part of the Vocational Education Project. This figure represents host government contribution toward vocational education which was composed of the Afghan Institute of Technology, Vocational Agriculture, Bilquis Girls School, and the Commercial School. The portion of these figures for AIT is not known.

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In addition to the preceding figures, 1,576,000 Afs. from PL 550 Wheat Fund are being used to repair and refurbish the present school plant.

The University of Wyoming provided a total of 19 individual contract technicians and 1 secretary. Their tours were of varying lengths. The greatest number provided any one year was 9; the least was 4. The first direct-hire technician arrived in August, 1961 and the other in September, 1961.

To date, 13 participants have received training abroad under the program, and of this number 8 have completed requirements for BS or higher degrees. Eight additional participants are now receiving training in the United States. The 13 participants who have returned are presently working in the fields for which they were trained, with 11 teaching at AIT and two at the Faculty of Engineering of Kabul University.

In 1955 the technicians of the Wyoming University assumed an active part in direction and operation of the school. The team had a technical director or advisor and members of the team served as teachers with the assistance of local instructor-counterparts. Participants trained abroad returned to the school to instruct and the use of American technicians for actual classroom instruction diminished. Only four technicians remained from 1959 to the phase-out of the contract. Both returned participants and graduates of AIT comprise the present teaching staff at AIT.

Commodities for AIT include industrial machines, machine tools, automotive equipment, electronic equipment, testing devices, shop tools and supplies, vehicles, textbooks, reference books, library materials, chalkboards, laboratory equipment, economical reproduction equipment and supplies, and miscellaneous stationery supplies necessary to develop and operate a technical preparatory program.

IV. Factors Accelerating or Inhibiting Progress

A. Host Country

1. Inhibiting Factors

a. Administrative Arrangements

The lack of sound or even organized administrative procedures or the personnel to administer any program is always a problem in a developing country. This condition has been especially true in Afghanistan during the last decade. Technical education was not known until the forming of the Afghan Institute of Technology. Machinery for running such a program had not been planned, personnel with any training in the field was not available, and pre-planning had not been conducted.

Perhaps the greatest single retarding factor has been the arrangement with which AIT and its administration has been tied to the Ministry of Education. The office of Vocational Education within the Ministry of Education has been and still is responsible for all Vocational Education in the entire country including Home Economics, Commercial Arts and Crafts, Trade, Extension, Nursing and the whole field of Teacher Education. This is much too large a responsibility even in developed countries. To add to the problem, there has been only one person, President of Vocational Education, attempting to carry out these responsibilities, he being a product of the French lycee educational system and for a time director of a German Mechanical School, a semi-trade school in grades 7, 8 and 9. Very recently a new man has been appointed to this position, a man with a Doctors Degree in academic chemistry with no experience or knowledge in either the theoretical or applied side of technician training. Within the last three months, an assistant with training at Purdue has been appointed with responsibility in technical and trade education. This addition should make it easier for USAID advisors to communicate as to advisement and problems at AIT. Further, over the years, the directors of AIT have been men who have been connected for years with the Ministry of Education in various capacities but trained in pre-AIT thinking, and none have had training or experience in the direction or supervision of a technical school in grades 10, 11 and 12. In addition these men were not technically trained themselves.

Wisely or unwisely the fact that American advisement to AIT for many years showed an actual American director hindered the training of an Afghan administrator and also retarded the development of the school as an Afghan Institution. This same situation existed down to the actual teaching where, for years, instruction was done by Americans which caused two conditions (1) curtailment in development of actual Afghan teaching personnel and (2) gave too much of an American complexion to the program and in many cases, perhaps, not sufficiently geared to the needs of the country.

b. Understanding of Technical Factors

The lack of knowledge and understanding of the factors involved in technical education, particularly technician training at AIT, has been and continues to be obvious daily. As was pointed out in part (a) of this section, this measurement has been perhaps the greatest single retarding factor to AIT's development. As an example, recommendations of present and past US advisors, and experience strongly indicate that the AIT program should be extended to the 13th and 14th year levels. Gradually as more host country Ministry of Education officials understand the technical factors involved through travel, further study and experience, the value of the idea will be accepted. This has been true since the beginning of AIT during which time there has always been a tendency on the part of the Royal Government of Afghanistan to make the program more academic,

more college preparatory, more in conformity with the lycee pattern. Why, because this is the type of system most educated Afghans were brought up under and understand. The lack of understanding of technical factors continues to inhibit progress but to a gradually lessening degree.

c. Legislation

In Afghanistan's present stage of development, a sound legislative program has not been developed. This has been particularly true in the field of technical education. Even more so, is the case of AIT, the only school in the field of technician training. It appears that at the present time the lack of sound legislation, in our sense of the term, somewhat restricts further expansion of the program basically in terms of budgetary matters. At present, the RCA and USAID/Afghanistan are attempting to develop a legislative system for expansion of the program within the framework of the country's new Five Year Program.

d. Financial Support

The financial support by the host country in reference to the development of the program at the Afghan Institute of Technology has been very limited since the beginning of the direct assistance by the US Government. A major financial contribution was given in the years 1952 - 1956 when the American staff not connected with the US Government was jointly financed by the Ministry of Education, UNESCO, ITAF, and other foundations. In the years 1956 - 1961 the host country's major contribution was in the form of salaries for the local teacher component. Starting January 1, 1962, an attempt is being made to have the Afghans assume a larger amount of responsibility in the operating functions of the school. This, of course, is in line with having all the functions eventually taken over by the Afghan Government at which time USAID will phase out of the project. There is at present and has always been a major problem involved in ways and means of securing expendable supplies.

e. Training Afghan Teaching Personnel

Even though an important accelerating factor in the development of AIT has been the large number of faculty members trained abroad, particularly in America, a larger inhibiting factor has been that none of the directors or the persons responsible for the administration of the program have had advanced training in a foreign country in either technical or vocational education. Consequently, the situation exists where many of the faculty members are more solidly grounded in the principles of technical education than the Afghan administrators of the program. For practically the entire 12 years of the existence of AIT, the President of Vocational Education has been a man with no technical education training, and the directors of the school itself have been men of the French lycee system.

f. Inability of Afghan Officials to Make Routine Decisions

The long delay encountered in getting officials to make routine decisions in connection with the program has hindered progress considerably. Due to the absence of petty cash or maintenance funds, this problem is accentuated even more when immediate decisions are necessary for the smooth operation of the program. All decisions regarding the expenditure of funds, minor changes in the program, regardless of how small, must be submitted through the regular government channels which entails considerable delay.

g. Lack of Office Space for Advisor in the Ministry Building

The advisor is of the opinion that he can only be effective if a very close working relationship exists between the advisors and the Ministry of Education officials working on the project. It is difficult to promote this type of relationship when the advisors and officials are housed in separate buildings a considerable distance apart. This set up necessitates the making of formal appointments to discuss the elementary matters of mutual concern.

h. Other Factors

In addition to the above-mentioned factors controlling accelerating and inhibiting of progress in the development of AIT, certain other conditions have influenced the development:

1. Geographical Distance from the United States

The tremendous distance involved and high cost of transportation have had an effect on the implementation of the program. This time lag in many cases has caused discontinuities between the planning and actual implementation of the program.

2. International Situation

Due to the fact that Afghanistan has had difficulties with its neighbors at least on two occasions whereby the borders were closed, the smooth operation of the program has been effected. The most recent illustration is the present closing which has resulted in approximately 45 per cent of the total dollars budgeted for supplies and commodities spent in transportation.

2. Accelerating Factors

a. Interest Level

US interest and assistance to AIT started in the early 50's first in the form of an American staff and then with the US Government through Wyoming University in the form of complete advisement to its development. From the very

beginning, the interest by the Afghans in the Afghan Institute of Technology was high. From its inception, AIT has always been a school with a high prestige factor as indicated by its name. This prestige factor of Afghan culture transcends many other considerations. The Afghan Government has always shown a high degree of interest in the development of AIT in manners that they know. For example, during Jeshyn time, exhibits of AIT always occupy a prominent position and indeed are reviewed by the King himself each year. Interest and pride in AIT by the RCA may be out of proportion to the degree of material assistance given to the program by the host government.

b. Physical Plant

The actual physical plant of the Afghan Institute of Technology has been in general adequate for the program. Even though the building was constructed in various stages and without a sound architectural guidance, the plant has answered basic needs for technician training. To date, the RCA provision of space has been an accelerating force; however, due to the size of the plant, further expansion will not be possible. Consequently, USAID is advising the construction of a new, larger facility, one large enough to include not only a larger day program, but also the addition of years 13 and 14 together with extension and part-time programs.

c. Returned Participants

Carefully selected Afghan teachers who have been recipients of US training grants and have returned as teachers and department heads have provided the leadership and foundation to build a strong future program. Of the present faculty of 39, 14 have received training in America or Europe. These persons with a few years of American on-the-job guidance will carry on and form the nucleus and foundation for future technical schools and programs in Afghanistan.

B. United States

1. Inhibiting Factors

a. Planning

The lack of long-range documented planning on the part of the US has had a serious retarding force to development of AIT. Objectives have not over the years been carefully worked out and agreed to with the host government. A sound developmental philosophy has not been in existence resulting in considerable change in objectives and methods each time a shift was made in American advisors. Even though American advisors have in general been of high caliber, they came from widely different parts of the country with different philosophies of technician training. In the early years of development of a program, this has had a coordinating effect. Target goals were not established and planning was only on a year-by-year basis.

Due to the relationship, both working and staff, that existed in years 1956 to January 1, 1962, between USAID and contract teams USAID/A Education Division was not involved with real planning at AIT and was not in a position to offer continuity and smoothness in long-term planning. In addition, Wyoming personnel involved in the operation of AIT did not as a group have the kind of background and experience required for technician training planning.

b. Contractor Selection and Staffing

The problem of contractor selection and project staffing has been one of much discussion. The problem was put forward by the Afghans to a point where finally USAID replaced the contract team with direct-hire technicians. The problem reached real consequence when it was realized that better than 75 per cent of the participants sent to the States under the project were sent to the contractor's home university. Not only this, but many returned participants expressed dissatisfaction over treatment, such as discrimination and lack of understanding on the part of Wyoming University personnel while they were in the United States. From the initiation of the project, project on-the-job supervision was conducted by the Wyoming Contract group. The advisors served as school operators and administrators rather than in an advisory capacity. Unfortunately, very little effort was made to train capable Afghans for responsible positions in the school. It is very evident that this arrangement created considerable friction between advisors and Afghan officials resulting in poor working relationships and retarding project progress.

c. Mission Policy

The lack of a firm, well defined USAID stand on the part of the Education Division adequately backed by the Mission administration has been a serious frustrating and inhibiting factor to project progress. Previous to January 1, 1962, the Mission stand on AIT had been wavering. In relations with the Ministry of Education, it seems that clear cut and well defined goals had not been established. Not only has this been true but the needed established mutual direction acquired through top level USAID/RGA negotiations has not been forthcoming.

2. Accelerating Factors

a. Financing - US

Project financing has been very adequate. In many instances, funds have been readily available much faster than could be used at the time they were programmed because of Afghan government delays in project activity implementation. There is no evidence that US implementation and staffing has been inadequate at any time during project operations.

C. Performance Improvement

This reporter feels that performance could have been considerably improved and long and short objectives more nearly met by the following means:

1. Having had the operation of the project directly under the USAID/ Education Division reporting to the Education Division Chief from the start.

2. All planning should have been carried out, at best, in conjunction with the Education Division. Planning should have been both short and long range, clearly worked out in conjunction with host country officials, clearly containing target dates and accomplishment markers and the project progress should have been kept in step with this planning and equated against target dates.

3. An advisory council should have been established very early so as to offer guidance and industrial cooperation to both Afghans and American personnel connected with AIT. If this had been done, the problem of communication and establishment of rapport with the Ministries and industry would have been erased. We at present would not face the situation of educating the Ministry officials to the need of 13th and 14th year courses. By this time, Ministry of Education officials would already have recognized the need and have requested that American advisors recommend such a program.

4. Selection of advisors and staff should have been done with a greater awareness of Afghan needs and stage of development. In many cases American personnel on this project did not possess either the training or experience in technician training or the industrial experience required for an AIT staff advisory member. In many cases, project staff members of the Wyoming team had never had courses in technical education or had been a technician or supervised technicians in the US. In some cases, persons were recruited from areas not having technician training.

5. This writer feels it was unwise to hire a contract team to administer a project the size and importance of AIT at the same time that the team also has a contract to develop a faculty of engineering, the financial arrangement being such that monies and commodities from one project could be funneled to the other without adequate US assistance and supervision. Now a year after USAID direct hire technicians have assumed the responsibility for this project, it is still unable to account for considerable equipment and materials purchased under contract two team project direction.

6. This reporter further feels that the main USAID advisor or project supervisor should have had and should have in the future far greater voice in selection of his American staff members and assistants. This should be done either by giving him a voice in their actual recruitment or interviewing them in the States before final hiring or some other workable scheme. Even though USAID/Personnel in Washington tries to meet SPAR definitions, the qualities of a prospective technician so necessary for Afghanistan and AIT can only be evaluated by the project supervisor actually familiar with the situation.

V. Accomplishments

Evaluation of this project in terms of progress toward achievement of short and long range project objectives and relevant to national development will be discussed in this section. However, many fringe benefits not relative to specific objectives have been and are being accomplished. One highly positive asset from the US point of view is that the Afghan Institute of Technology has been one of the few truly American projects. It has been and is still considered such, not only by the Ministry of Education, but also by the average Afghan. It might also be added that USAID assistance in education is to a large degree judged by the manner in which we handle this project. Along with the Afghan realization that AIT is an American advised Afghan project goes both the advantages and responsibilities of this image. We are complimented for the positive aspects and surely criticized for the negative aspects according to Afghan standards. Consequently, fringe benefits not relative to project objectives are a specific part of accomplishments. It is often said that Americans at AIT have done more to establish US-Afghan understanding than any other American sponsored institution.

Fulfillment of short and long range project objectives continues with varying degrees of success. It is not the intent or purpose of this study to determine who should receive credit for successes to date or who should be blamed for failures; however, both the host government and US Foreign Aid Program should be credited as this is a cooperative program.

With the above statements in mind, the Balance Sheet of Accomplishments as presented is as objective as possible.

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ComponentsBeginning June 19551962 Status

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Afghan Institute of
TechnologyBackground

Agreement signed June 1955
between RCA and TCA

Faculty
Quantity

Previous to 1955, AIT was
established by Ministry of
Education in 1951 with 5
American teachers - part by
MOE, UNESCO, ITAF and founda-
tions.

Total 38 includes 1 director,
1 assistant director, 4 foreign
American English teachers, 2
civil aviation teachers - ICAO
paid - also a satisfactory
component of tool boys, janitors,
etc.

Quality

Seven American including one
director and 6 teachers
arrived in 1955 - counterparts
consisted of Afghan director
and his small staff - none with
higher than 12th grade education

One American advisor to Ministry
of Education, 1 American advisor
to Director of AIT, 9 Afghans
with BS or MS degrees, all trained
in US, 5 less than BS trained in
Europe, remainder including
director and assistant director
all with at least 12th grade
training - director went to US
for approximately one year.

Class Materials

Some materials had been
developed prior to 1955 by
American staff between the
years of 1951 - 1955

English is 1st language of
instruction, most 10th grade
courses conducted in Farsi
because English ability not
sufficient at this stage.
Gradually, teaching materials
being developed in English,
later to be translated into
Farsi for use if AIT eventually
becomes a Farsi school.

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Components

Administration

Beginning June 1955

Under American Director - drastically restricted in power because of Ministry of Education restrictions. Counterpart not a career man in technical education field.

1962 Status

School director with limited background and little authority because of Ministry direction. Also an assistant director likewise not trained in technical education administration. Recently a new position as Director General in Technical Education has been established. USAID advisor to Ministry as well as USAID advisor to administration of AIT.

Employment Incentive

Low salary requiring outside source of income. Prestige factor of school high - Negative - incentive was RGA assigning teachers in lieu of military service.

Salaries still relatively low - prestige factor high - opportunity for further training in US strong incentive - association with American teachers a factor - on occasion RGA still assigns teachers in lieu of military conscription.

Curriculum

Three year American type system grades 10, 11, 12 - very high in math and science college slanted. Low on practical approach. Lecture system utilized.

Three year American type system grades 10, 11, 12, high in math, science. Somewhat more practical. College preparatory slanted. Majority of course outlines inadequate.

Student Body
(guess number)

All boys - total 123
42 10th grade
42 11th grade
39 12th grade

All boys - total 331
115 10th grade
125 11th grade
91 12th grade

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Components

Physical Plant

Beginning June 1955

Plant not geared to needs of technical education - major emphasis on classroom space. RCA owned and managed - badly in need of repairs. Little shop space, building consisted of only part of present one. Except for classrooms, building area skeleton construction - having been a textile factory before with high barn type construction. No library.

1962 Status

Plant expanded - not according to any master plan - RCA owned and managed - not adequate for objectives of expanded program. Four shops have been added. Still lacking blackboard space, lighting facilities and heat. Desk and chair in poor condition. Due to lack of dormitory space, several classrooms are now being used, library adequate in volume numbers but not in kinds. Library poorly equipped and lighted. Building is on 18 acre plot but none is landscaped except where buildings are situated.

Graduates

Total of 64 graduates to date - 28 in year 1954 - 6 out of freshman class were dropped - all graduates were placed with the Ministries.

By 1962 total graduates to date 514. 90 graduated in 1962 - 35 students to go to Kabul University remaining 55 placed in Ministries. There was an attrition factor of from 125 entering to 90 graduating in the 1962 class.

Budget

Budget adequate since monies were supplied by foreign agencies i.e., UNESCO, ITAF and foundations. Afghan budget not planned or accepted practical procedures used.

Budget developed on country-wide plan adequate in most aspects except operating expenses are totally inadequate. Purchasing of needed expendable materials involve a complex and rigorous experience in servicing due to the amount of red tape involved. Budget planning needs improvements.

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Components

Technical Education
in Other Schools

Beginning June 1955

None

1962 Status

Starting March 1963 a pre-vocational course of four hours in 9th grade will be initiated in Ebni-Seena - the main feeder middle school to both AIT and Vo-Ag schools. Plans call for this program to be extended to 7th and 8th grades as supplies and commodities are available.

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VI. Appraisal of Reporting Technical Division

Afghanistan is a country where programmed progress on a project is seldom realized. The attainment of logical objectives has not been realized to the degree expected. However, the personnel of the reporting Technical Division have only been in Afghanistan for one and one-half years, and may be looking for progress that we feel should have taken place after ten years of US and foreign assistance without allowing for the real obstacles encountered in Afghanistan.

The actual rate of advancement has not been as rapid as anticipated. One basic reason has been the lack of identifiable clear-cut programmed objectives, ones that contained target dates worked out with an in accord with the RCA. Briefly, the school apparently started as a combination of college preparatory and college level since it was the most advanced school in the country at the time. Gradually, with the founding of Kabul University and the coming of Wypning University to the AIT project, not only did objectives change but also the standards of the school were lowered for a time. This occurred, it seems, because of a lack of solid plan.

From as early as 1958 American advisors on the project have seen the need for the addition of the 13th and 14th years, and expressed same in writing. Yet here in 1963 little has been done to realize this aim.

Afghan Institute of Technology over the years has answered a very real need in Afghan culture. It has always been a school of high prestige factor, offering a good course for college of engineering students. The school has trained numerous students to a level where they could go to the US and elsewhere and do college level work. Many persons in responsible positions were former AIT students.

Indications are, i.e., numbers graduating, years of curriculum, type of curriculum, lack of adult programs, etc., that AIT has not recently kept pace with the manpower needs of the country. Surveys and recent findings indicate that larger numbers should be graduated with greater emphasis in the technician training field. It is also felt that programs should be extended to different parts of the country to serve on a nation-wide basis either as extensions to AIT or separate entities.

With the employment of direct-hire technicians on the project, disregarding any political or noneducational obstacles, it is hoped that the development of AIT in the future will be in accord with objectives developed by USAID, MOE and the needs of the country commensurate with the stage of development of the economy. Progress has already been made during the past year and with the new high priority rating assigned to the project, the program should again attain its dynamic growth.

In conclusion it seems advisable to highlight and summarize both important successes and failures of this project:

Successes

1. A sound school has been established that can be used as a pattern for expected future schools in other provinces.
2. A considerable number of personnel have been trained abroad to form a good nucleus for leaders in technician training for future years.
3. AIT has been established as a school of high prestige and is an example of USAID foreign assistance.
4. Program is developing to gradually meet the technician manpower needs for the Kabul area at present and later on a country-wide basis.
5. This school has been the main source for freshman engineering students for Kabul University.

Failures

1. Failed to develop a technician training program at the expense of making the school basically college preparatory.
2. Failed to secure addition of 13th and 14th years necessary for technician training.
3. Failed to establish either good accepted administrative procedures at AIT or train the men to administer these procedures.
4. Failed to develop sound budgetary procedures.
5. Failed to train students equipped to meet the technical manpower needs of the country.
6. Failed to have AIT maintain the continuing leadership required for the number one model technical school in the country.

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VII. Director's Comment

Despite the expansion in enrollment from 123 to 331 and in graduates per year from 39 to 91, the Afghan Institute of Technology has not expanded rapidly enough for the needs of Afghanistan. One of the results of this is discussed in a classified addendum to this report being pouched subsequently.

It would appear that at least one cause of this slow growth was the fact that Afghan officials themselves were not closely involved and did not fully understand the type of training being offered. The report suggests that an advisory committee would have helped - one is now being organized. Another way to have created understanding would have been a short tour to the United States of educational officials to visit schools for technicians. Such trips for "VIP's" often make it easier for other participants to get ideas accepted.

Finally, it appears that the USAID did not concern itself as directly in negotiations with the Ministry of Education (MOE) as hindsight would show necessary. This is a danger when reliance is placed on a contract team and when direct-hire people are too few to supervise contract activities in six fields - engineering, agriculture college, vo-ag school, technical school, teacher training, and English teaching.